Complementary Protection in Australia: Filling the Gap in the Protection of Asylum Seekers by Farrelly, Sarah
                                                       
 
 
 
                                                       
 
 
 
                                                      1 
 
 
 
 
COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION IN AUSTRALIA: 
 
FILLING THE GAP IN THE PROTECTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 A famous image of the well known London Underground phrase “Mind the Gap”, available at 
http://www.sabusinessclub.com/event_images/thumbs/Mind%20the%20Gap.jpg (accessed 26 May, 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There is currently a gaping hole in the effective protection of asylum seekers in Australia. The 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees  (hereinafter, the “Refugee Convention”)2 
is the cornerstone document in dealing with the protection of persons seeking asylum. 
However, if a person in need of international protection falls outside its legally narrow ambit, 
their protection is uncertain. The issue of complementary forms of protection has thus been 
identified as a vital protection mechanism to add to the Refugee Convention. International 
obligations have been developed under other human rights instruments to provide additional, 
or alternative, protection, but the lack of a binding nature of these obligations results in a lack 
of comprehensive protection.  
 
In some regions, the Refugee Convention itself has been expanded to include those persons 
falling outside its legal definition of “refugee”3. This was done by African States in the 
Organisation of the African Union Convention4 and by Latin American States in the 
Cartagena Declaration5.  Both these mechanisms provide for the expansion of the domestic 
refugee definition to include those in need of complementary protection. Other states have 
opted for the use of a system of “Complementary Protection”6, where asylum seekers 
applications will be assessed against international human rights treaties as well as the Refugee 
Convention. A separate visa category is introduced to cover those in need of protection who 
do not fall within the Refugee Convention definition. This option has been followed by the 
United States and Canada, as well as the European Union through a “Qualification Directive”7 
                                                
2 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on 28 July, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_c_ref.htm (accessed 12 February, 2009) 
3 The legal definition of “refugee” is discussed shortly, at para. 1.2 
4 The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
includes “Any person compelled to leave his/her country ‘owing to external aggression, occupation, 
foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country 
of origin or nationality”, available at 
http://www.africaunion.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Refugee_Co
nvention.pdf (accessed 16 March, 2009) 
5 The 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees includes “Persons who have fled their country 
‘because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign 
aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have 
seriously disturbed public order’, available at 
http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/international/CentralAmerica.PDF (accessed 16 March, 2009) 
6 I will discuss the definitions of this concept in section 1 
7 The full title being the “Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification 
and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and the content of the protection granted”, 29 April, 2004, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0083:EN:HTML (accessed 15 
February, 2009). This Directive will be discussed as part of a comparative analysis with 
Complementary Protection in the Case Study. 
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aimed at harmonising asylum procedures across Europe. The development of a system of 
Complementary Protection is also a goal of the “Agenda for Protection”8 adopted by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 2002, which outlines one of its core 
objectives as “Provision of complementary forms of protection to those who might not fall 
within the scope of the 1951 Convention but require international protection”9. 
 
Complementary Protection has thus become a feature of most Western protection systems, but 
notably not yet in Australia. It is therefore a controversial issue here, with Australia remaining 
one of the few developed countries which has yet to establish a system of codified 
complementary protection. Australia thus lacks a visa category for those persons who fall 
outside the criteria for the grant of “refugee” status, and so their cases are currently decided 
by a Ministerial Discretion. The introduction of a codified system of complementary 
protection is thus now at the forefront of the Australian Labour government’s agenda with the 
newly released “Draft Complementary Protection Visa Model” (hereinafter, the “Draft 
Model”) in November 200810. This Draft Model, if legislated, will provide the comprehensive 
protection which has been lacking in the domestic system, assessing asylum seekers against 
both the Refugee Convention, as well as the applicable international human rights treaties. It 
will ensure that Australia is both fulfilling its international obligations as well as meeting 
international best practice, and the promises made by the Australian government when 
adopting the “Agenda for Protection”11. It will also improve the efficiency of the current 
immigration practise, reducing costs and eliminating the current time-wasting procedures. It is 
vital that in the light of the new Rudd government, as well as the “new values”12 in 
immigration which it is promising, that the gap in protection of those in need is filled. 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine this proposed Draft Model for Complementary Protection 
in Australia, and assess whether it will help to fill the gap in the protection of asylum seekers. 
In meeting this aim, I will first look to some basic definitions of Complementary Protection. I 
will then examine the Refugee Convention definition of “refugee” which illustrates the 
narrowness of the current legal definition, and thus the categories of persons who fall outside 
                                                
8 UNHCR’s Agenda for Protection, 3rd Edition, October 2003, available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3e637b194 (accessed 12 February, 2009) 
9 Ibid. at Goal 1, Objective 3 
10 “Draft Complementary Protection Visa Model: Australia”, circulated prior to the 13 November, 2008 
consultation on complementary protection and work rights, Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship, www.immi.gov.au (accessed June, 2009) 
11 Australia implemented UNHCR’s Agenda for Protection in 2004 
12 “New values” announced at “New Directions in Detention- Restoring integrity to Australia’s 
Immigration System”, speech by Minister for Immigration Chris Evans, at Australian National 
University, Canberra, 29th July 2008, text available at 
http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/speeches/2008/ce080729.htm (accessed 3 February, 2009) 
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its protection. I will then turn to the development of non-refoulement13 obligations under 
human rights law. These international obligations greatly affect the position of asylum seekers 
as they attempt to provide an alternative form of protection to the Refugee Convention. The 
development of these international obligations has also greatly affected the traditional concept 
of state sovereignty. The sovereignty of states is thus a vital issue to look at as it is a potential 
reason for the gap between the theory of international obligations and the reality of domestic 
implementation. This requires an examination of the tensions between a state’s right to 
sovereignty versus its duty to fulfil international obligations of protection. Analysing these 
concepts should shed some light as to why this gap between theory and reality exists.  
 
Armed with this theory and background, I will then look to the case study of Complementary 
Protection in Australia, which is an example of such a gap between international obligations 
and domestic implementation. This case study will illustrate how Australia is attempting to 
fill the gap in the protection of asylum seekers.  It is important to first examine the current 
system in place, which shows the inadequacy of a Ministerial Discretion to meet international 
obligations, and thus the need for reform. I will then analyse details of the proposed reform 
i.e. the Draft Model, looking at persons both included and excluded in the proposed system. I 
will finally carry out a comparative analysis with the E.U. Qualification Directive. This E.U. 
system of “subsidiary protection”, which has been in place for over four years, has faced 
many interesting challenges over the interpretation of some of its provisions. Examining 
particular aspects of this legislation will enable us to learn from the experience which the E.U. 
has gone through, thus providing guidance for the implementation of such protection in 
Australia’s future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 “Non-refoulement” is core refugee law principle which prevents the return of a refugee, or asylum 
seeker, to their home state where they would face persecution or a respective threat to their life or 
freedom. I will discuss this principle in detail below. 
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1. COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION 
 
Complementary Protection has been described as simply being the intersection between 
human rights law and refugee law, or better yet, where they fail to intersect14. It is a form of 
protection aimed at protecting asylum seekers who fall outside the ambit of the Refugee 
Convention, yet who are still in need of international protection. It is not an “emergency or 
provisional device”15 in response to a mass influx of asylum seekers, but rather a “response by 
states to individual asylum seekers who cannot be removed by virtue of the extended 
principle of non-refoulement under international law”16. While it does not have an 
international law definition, it has been an important issue globally in recent years with a 
great expansion in the numbers as well as the categories of people seeking international 
protection17. Prior to examining the obligations under international law which have a bearing 
on the status of non-Convention refugees, it is necessary to first look at the protection gap 
between the Refugee Convention and the range of persons in need of international protection. 
This entails a proper examination of the scope of the definition of a “refugee” under the 
Refugee Convention. 
 
2.1 Defining a “refugee” 
 
“We turn to human rights doctrine for assistance in filling out the grey areas. In doing so, we 
may wonder why it is permissible to distinguish in favour of Convention refugees, when other 
violations of rights seem no less serious. Why do some types of harm carry more ‘value’ than 
others?”18 
The Refugee Convention, drafted in 1951, must be viewed very much as a document of its 
time. Post World War II, the issue of refugees was at the forefront of the minds of political 
leaders. The Refugee Convention was drafted with the primary function of establishing a 
substitute protection system for those who had lost the protection of their home state. It thus 
                                                
14 McAdam, Jane, “The Refugee Convention as a rights blueprint for persons in need of international 
protection”, UNHCR Research paper No. 125, July 2006, p. 1 
15 Mandal, R, “Protection Mechanisms outside of the 1951 Convention (‘Complementary Protection’) 
UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series PPLA/2005/02 (June 2005) 
16 McAdam, Jane (2007), Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law, Oxford University 
Press, p. 3 
17 The UN recently released a report, “Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialised Countries, 2008 - 
Statistical Overview of Asylum Applications Lodged in Europe and selected Non-European 
Countries”, 24th March, 2009, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/49c796572.pdf (accessed 10 May, 2009), which outlines 
that there has been a 12 per cent increase in 2008 of new asylum applications over the number from 
2007 
18 Goodwin-Gill, Guy S., “Editorial: Asylum 2001 – A Convention and a Purpose” (2001) 13 IJRL 1, 
p. 8 
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has a highly historical context, and its contents can be seen as reactive to the refugee problem 
which existed at the time. The drafters were focussing on two specific groups; first, the 
refugees from Nazi Germany who were in search of sanctuary, and secondly, displaced 
Eastern Europeans who refused to return to their countries after the war was over. The 
definition drawn up in the Refugee Convention therefore similarly reflected this focus on 
particular types of refugee. Under Article 1 of the Refugee Convention, a refugee is defined 
as someone who is outside their country of nationality and has a “well-founded fear”19 of 
being persecuted for one of five reasons; namely “race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion”20. They must also be unwilling or unable to avail 
of the protection of their country of nationality21.  
 
The document thus never intended to cover all persons in need of protection22. A refugee after 
all has both a formal legal meaning, but also a more generic one. It can simply mean someone 
fleeing for safety, and thus the narrowness of the legal definition means that many asylum 
seekers in need of protection are falling outside the cornerstone definition within the Refugee 
Convention. The five grounds contained in Article 1 thus limit in many ways the modern 
categorising of displaced persons23. The specificity in the definition means that it does not 
encompass people for example who are stateless, who have been subject to gross violations of 
their human rights for reasons other than those listed in the Convention, or who would face 
torture upon return to their home country. Recognising that a “refugee-like predicament 
should result in a refugee-like status”24, the idea of an alternative or “complementary” form of 
protection has thus evolved.  These “complementary” forms of protection are based on the 
international obligations to protect which states have committed to upon ratification of 
various human rights instruments. I will now look specifically at the obligations of “non-
refoulement” which forms the basis for Australia’s proposed system of Complementary 
Protection. 
 
 
                                                
19 Article 1 of the Refugee Convention, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_c_ref.htm 
(accessed 12 February, 2009) 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Discussed in “Complementary Protection - The Way Ahead”, January 2004 Report developed by the 
Refugee Council of Australia, Amnesty International and the National Council of Churches of 
Australia, para. 1, available at www.ncca.org.au/cws/rdp/issues/complementary_protection (accessed 
15 February, 2009) 
23 Discussed in Crock, Mary, “The Refugees Convention at 50: Mid-life Crisis of Terminal 
Inadequacy? An Australian perspective” in Kneebone, Susan (ed), The Refugees Convention 50 Years 
On: Globalisation and International Law, Ashgate: Aldershot, UK (2003), 47-91 
24 McAdam, Jane (2007), Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law, Oxford University 
Press, p. 2 
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2.2 Non-refoulement obligations 
 
“Non-refoulement” is a core refugee law principle contained in Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention. This fundamental international rule prohibits states from returning a refugee to a 
territory where their “life or freedom would be threatened”25. Under the International Human 
Rights Law framework however, further non-refoulement obligations have been developed 
which attempt to cover those who fall outside the parameters of the Refugee Convention. The 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter, the “ICCPR”)26 and the 
Convention against Torture (hereinafter, “CAT”)27 also contain non-refoulement principles, 
both explicitly and implicitly28. These human rights instruments can provide protection 
through systems of Complementary Protection to those asylum seekers who fail to satisfy the 
legal definition of refugee29. Since Australia has ratified the Refugee Convention30, as well as 
the ICCPR31 and CAT32, it has thus undertaken a responsibility that it will abide by the non-
refoulement obligations contained in these treaties. Once asylum seekers arrive on Australian 
territory, and fall under one of the non-refoulement obligations, their safety becomes the 
responsibility of this state. With the current system of Ministerial Discretion in Australia, it is 
questionable whether Australia is sufficiently meeting this responsibility.  
 
I will now look at the interrelationship of these international obligations with the principle of 
state sovereignty. With their ability to transcend borders, international law and the core 
refugee law principle of non-refoulement have greatly impacted upon the traditionally 
supreme sovereign rights of states. The concept of state sovereignty thus remains a thorn in 
the side of the effective implementation of international obligations. I will look to the history 
                                                
25 Article 33.1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_c_ref.htm (accessed 12 February, 2009) 
26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted on 16 December, 1966, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (accessed 12 February, 2009), hereinafter “ICCPR” 
27 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted on 10 December, 1984, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm (accessed 12 
February, 2009), hereinafter “CAT” 
28 Article 3 of CAT outlines that “No state party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture”. 
Article 7 of ICCPR contains an implied non-refoulement obligation, outlining that “No one shall be 
subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment”. 
29 Other treaties including the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 1954 Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Racial Discrimination, and the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women do not impose such specific obligations on States, but they do provide 
a framework human rights standards which have been internationally accepted  
30 Australia ratified the Refugee Convention on 22 January, 1954 
31 Australia ratified the ICCPR on 13 November, 1980 
32 Australia ratified CAT on 8 August, 1989 
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of this concept, as well as the debate surrounding it currently which exemplifies how it is 
posing a barrier to the implementation of international obligations. The paradox between 
international obligations and the principle of state sovereignty is resulting in a gap in the 
protection of human rights. I will examine this paradox, looking to some political theories 
which help us to understand it. Through this examination I hope to highlight the divorce 
which exists between the theory of protection under the international framework, and the 
practical application of such a framework. I will then follow on with my analysis of the case 
study of Complementary Protection in Australia, which is looking to fill this gap in protection 
of asylum seekers in Australia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarah Farrelly  308263642 
 
 10 
 
2. WHY IS THERE A GAP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
AND DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION? 
 
The interplay between international obligations and their translation into practical protection 
for asylum seekers is a challenging area of interstate relations. Non-refoulement obligations 
essentially involve placing the responsibility of what was traditionally within the sphere of 
sovereignty of one state onto another. After all, a state is primarily responsible for the 
protection of its citizens, and international protection only arises where that primary state 
protection fails. Non-refoulement obligations shift this responsibility to the state where the 
person is seeking asylum. Without a codified system of Complementary Protection, Australia 
is failing to meet its international obligations. Prior to examining the current system in 
Australia, I will first look to two central challenges facing the domestic implementation of 
international obligations generally. First is the paradox between the natures of state 
sovereignty versus international obligations. These concepts essentially entail opposing ideas, 
and so the clash between them is resulting in a lack of protection for asylum seekers. 
Secondly is the challenge of enforcement measures of the obligations. Without systems of 
accountability or domestic implementation, the protection outlined under these obligations 
essentially becomes meaningless.  
 
2.2 A paradox in international law: State Sovereignty v. International Obligations 
 
In the situation of return, there is a clear tension arising between the right of a state and the 
duty of a state. A paradox exists that while states consent to be bound by international 
obligations; if these obligations do not fall in line with their national interests, where is the 
incentive to abide by them? It has been outlined that the “difficulty of the human rights-
sovereignty conundrum is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the situation of return”33. 
Under the principle of state sovereignty, states should have the ultimate authority in 
determining who remains on its territory, yet they also have a duty to fulfil an international 
commitment made of non-refoulement. Agreeing to these non-refoulement obligations, states 
are subjecting themselves to a fundamentally confronting issue; the arrival of non-citizens on 
their borders claiming a right to not be sent back to where they came from. How a state deals 
with the protection of non-citizens has historically been a matter of international importance, 
                                                
33 Van Selm-Thorburn, Joanna (1998), Refugee Protection in Europe – Lessons of the Yugoslav Crisis, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers p. 54 
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with a practice dating back to the 1800s of states refusing to extradite persons within their 
jurisdiction who faced prosecution for a political offence in their home state34.  
 
The concept of state sovereignty is in direct contradiction to the nature of non-refoulement 
obligations. Dating back to the Treaty of Westphalia in the 17th century, it is essentially seen 
as granting upon the State a “supreme authority within their territorial borders and (denying) 
the existence of any higher authority beyond these borders”35. The fundamental problem, 
however, with States not being accountable to any international authority was vividly 
demonstrated during the reign of Hitler and the Nazi forces. World War II was thus seen to 
bring about a new era in international relations. With the UN Charter in 194536, a period of 
transnational protection of human rights began. States now “grudgingly”37 became 
accountable to international human rights bodies, and so this developing international human 
rights law was potentially seen as the beginning of the end for the traditional concept of state 
sovereignty.  
 
State sovereignty and the desire of a state to put its self-interests first can be explained 
through the lens of realism. Realists view humans as first and foremost pursuing their own 
self-interests. In the context of world politics, realist theory sees states as only pursuing action 
where their self-interests are involved. In his pivotal work Politics Among Nations38, 
Morgenthau outlines that in the realm of world politics, the primary concern of a state is the 
acquisition and maintenance of power. He distinguishes the actions of states from those of 
individuals, arguing that political interests always come first, and thus universal moral 
principles cannot attach to states as they do to people39. The morality of any particular state 
instead is subject to concerns of self-preservation and the “desire for power”40. State 
sovereignty is one of the forefront barriers to the implementation of the international 
obligation of non-refoulement. According to his theory, treaties of international law will only 
be enforced when they are mutually beneficial for states. If there is a “direct bearing upon the 
relative power of the nations concerned”41, then the states will always enforce their self-
                                                
34 Lillich, Richard B. (1984), The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary International Law, 
Manchester University Press, p. 35 
35 Schwarz, Rolf, “The paradox of sovereignty, regime type and human rights compliance”, The 
International Journal of Human Rights, (2004) Vol. 8 (2), p. 199-215, p. 203 
36 The Charter of the United Nations came into force 24th October (1945), available at 
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/ch-cont.htm (accessed 4 February, 2009)   
37 Schwarz, Rolf, “The paradox of sovereignty, regime type and human rights compliance”, The 
International Journal of Human Rights, (2004) 8:2, p. 199-215 p. 214 
38 Morgenthau, Hans (1993), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, edited by 
Kenneth W. Thompson, Boston: McGraw Hill 
39 Ibid. p. 4 
40 Morgenthau, Hans (1946), Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, University of Chicago Press, p. 193 
41 Ibid. 
Sarah Farrelly  308263642 
 
 12 
interests first. Liberalism on the other hand, which is far more optimistic as to human nature, 
represents the way in which the nature of international human rights law should work. 
Tracing back to humanism which challenged the original notions of sovereignty, liberalism 
focuses on the desire of humans to share and help one another. In liberalist theory, nation 
states thus do not insist upon the traditional notions of state sovereignty, but rather recognise 
the legitimacy of the international system42. Applying the idealistic liberal theory to the 
international obligations of non-refoulement, there should be no barrier of state sovereignty. 
States should thus meet their international obligations and provide protection for all those 
who fall within one of the Conventions’ non-refoulement categories.  
 
Human rights, with its basis in international co-operation and universalism, fits well with 
liberal thought. On the other hand, the principle of state sovereignty, as evidenced by its 
current operation in Australia, appears to fit well with the realist rather than the liberalist 
mindset. The asylum policies adopted by the recent Australian governments clearly reflect 
Morganthau’s realist view of putting the self-interests of the State first. In order for the 
international non-refoulement obligations to pass the barrier of state sovereignty, it is clearly 
necessary for there to be sufficient enforcement mechanisms of these obligations. Currently, 
such effective enforcement mechanisms are lacking, and thus pose an impediment for 
effective protection. Without a requirement to abide by its international obligations, Australia 
has managed to avoid implementing a codified system of extended protection afforded by 
non-refoulement.  
 
2.3 Viability of the Human Rights framework : the challenges of enforcement 
 
International law, which differs from domestic law in its lack of a central law-making body, is 
often the subject of debate as to its legitimacy to govern the action of states. The enforcement 
of international human rights law has thus been met with numerous challenges, including 
“inter-state negotiations, compromise, and the accommodation of other goals and values”43. 
By signing on to human rights instruments which confer rights on individuals, states are 
accepting the reciprocal duties which these instruments impose. However, while these 
obligations are placed on States upon ratification of human rights instruments, the 
enforcement mechanisms are somewhat lacking. Human rights treaties essentially rely on the 
concept of consensus, i.e. states voluntarily sign up to them, and thus are expected to adhere 
to their obligations. Reporting systems do exist through the various Conventions’ Monitoring 
                                                
42 Grant, Ruth (1987), John Locke’s Liberalism, University of Chicago Press 
43 Cali, Basak, and Meckled-Garcia, Saladin (2006), “Lost in translation – the human rights ideal and 
international human rights law”, The Legalization of Human Rights, Routledge, p. 14 
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Bodies44 and under these systems states are expected to submit reports to the respective 
Monitoring Bodies. The idea is that a state is thus forced to assess its own actions, and this 
self-regulated aspect is then monitored by the Committee.  
 
The problem with this whole procedure however, is that there is essentially no retribution for 
a state failing to adhere to its obligations. Enforcement is based on the tactic of “naming and 
shaming” in the hope that countries will live up to the promises they have made when faced 
with scrutiny from the international public. The shortcomings of this monitoring system are 
vividly exemplified in the case of Elmi vs. Australia45 which I will discuss shortly; where 
Australia simply chose to ignore the findings of UNCAT. Herein lies the problem with the 
nature of achieving human rights protection through international obligations. While states 
sign up to international treaties which contain obligations including that of non-refoulement, 
the lack of enforcement methods mean these obligations often go unfulfilled.  
 
As well as there being a lack of accountability for not implementing the findings of these 
committees, there is no enforcement mechanisms to ensure these international obligations 
translate into effective domestic implementation. This poses a major challenge to the success 
of international obligations. As noted above, my case study of Complementary Protection in 
Australia directly exemplifies an attempt to legislate such domestic implementation of the 
international obligations of non-refoulement. Currently, no such domestic implementation 
exists. While Australia has ratified various Conventions which contain international 
obligations of non-refoulement, the state has failed to provide satisfactory codified protection 
at a domestic level. A Ministerial Discretion does exist to examine those cases which fall 
outside the Refugee Convention. However, as will be shown, the current system is inefficient, 
expensive and completely inadequate, resulting in a weak system of protection for asylum 
seekers. This case study shows clearly a divorce between the commitments given by states 
and the practical application of them. The gap that exists between the theory and reality of 
protection is thus evident as these formal obligations are not translating into effective 
protection of human rights. 
 
 
                                                
44 The UN Human Rights Committee was established to monitor the implementation of the ICCPR 
and the Protocols to the Covenant in the territory of States parties, see details at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/hrc.htm (accessed 5 June, 2009), while the UN Committee against 
Torture (hereinafter, “UNCAT”) was established pursuant to article 17 of CAT to monitor its 
implementation, see details at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cat/index.html (accessed 5 June, 
2009) 
45 Sadiq Shek Elmi V Australia, Communication No. 120/1998: Australia. 25/05/99. 
CAT/C/22/D/120/1998. I will discuss this in detail below at para. 3.3 
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3. CASE STUDY: THE CURRENT SYSTEM IN AUSTRALIA 
 
Box 1. Current Refugee Status Determination System in Australia 
 
The current system in Australia to deal with asylum seekers falling outside the Refugee 
Convention is by way of a Ministerial Discretion. The process which faces the arrival of non-
Convention refugees to Australia (see Box 1) is clearly a lengthy and cumbersome one. 
Asylum seekers arriving on Australian shores can only apply for the Minister of Immigration 
to exercise his discretion after the refugee process has failed. Many therefore, knowing that 
they do not fit within the Refugee Convention definition, still have to go through the lengthy 
application process just to be rejected, so that they can then apply for this discretion. Thus it is 
Assessment by Department of Immigration 
(DIAC): 
• Assessment against criteria for refugee 
status  
• Assessment against health and character 
requirements 
 
   YES          NO 
 
Grant of Protection Visa 
 
Appeal to Refugee 
Review Tribunal (RRT) 
 
     YES     NO 
Recommendation to 
DIAC that a Protection 
Visa be granted 
 
Request to the Minister 
for Immigration to use 
discretionary powers to 
make a favourable 
decision 
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clearly a “grossly inefficient”46 system, which essentially forces asylum seekers to lodge 
unmeritorious claims through the refugee system so that they can get to the end stage of 
applying for Ministerial Discretion. I will shortly assess the proposed Draft Model, examining 
whether it is an improvement on the current system, and whether it will be sufficient to fill the 
gaps in protection. 
 
Under the current process, the applicant’s claim is assessed against the Refugee Convention 
criteria, but not against the other human rights instruments which Australia has ratified as 
discussed above47. If the strict criteria for refugee status, as well as the health and character 
requirements are met with satisfaction, then a protection visa will be granted. If the 
application is refused, the applicant may first appeal to the Refugee Review Tribunal, or if 
this fails, they may then finally apply to the Minister for Immigration to exercise his 
Ministerial discretion. This discretionary procedure (see the highlighted box in Box 1) is 
legislated in section 417 of the 1958 Migration Act48.  This procedure is “non-compellable, 
non-reviewable, and non-delegable”49. The Minister for Immigration thus does not have to 
intervene, and if they do, there is no obligation to give reasons for their decision. There is 
ultimately no guarantee that the applicant’s application will even be processed. This system is 
clearly in no way appropriate to meet the international commitments which Australia has 
made, and should be immediately legislated and subject to judicial review so as to ensure 
consistency, transparency and accountability.  
 
3.2 Inappropriateness of the Current System of Ministerial Discretion 
 
“One wrong decision to return someone home could mean torture, persecution or death. To 
leave such a decision in the hands of the Minister of the day, without any transparency or 
accountability, is to subject claimants to the vagaries of politics and the Minister’s personal 
whim.”50 
                                                
46 McAdam, Jane, “Complementary protection: Labour’s point of departure”, Inside Story article, 3 
December, 2008, available at www.inside.org.au/complementary-protection (accessed 15 February, 
2009) 
47 See discussion above of non-refoulement obligations at para. 1.3 
48 Migration Act 1958, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ma1958118/ 
(accessed 5 February, 2009) 
49 McAdam, Jane (2007), Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law, Oxford University 
Press p. 131 
50 Field, Nina, “Playing God with sanctuary – A study of Australia’s approach to complementary 
protection obligations beyond the Refugee Convention” (quoting Thomson, James, from the National 
Council of Churches), Oxfam Australia Report, June 2008, available at 
http://www.oxfam.org.au/campaigns/refugees/docs/CP-PlayingGod-080604.pdf (accessed 16 February, 
2009)  
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The fact that the current Minister for Immigration himself has compared his discretionary 
power in this area to “playing God”51 clearly highlights the need to implement immediate 
reform. When looking to the role a minister should play, the Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship should clearly not be left to personally go through asylum seeker cases one-by-
one52.  The Discretion was designed to deal with only exceptional cases, and thus legislation 
is clearly needed to remove this inappropriate burden on the Minister. It is giving too much 
power to one individual, leaving this Ministerial position open to claims of an abuse of power. 
With the massive increase in the number of cases appealed to the Minister under section 417 
in recent years, this particular discretion is no longer appropriate. As of January 2, 2009, it 
was reported there were 2,793 requests for intervention53. Due to the inability of asylum 
seekers to apply directly for complementary protection, major unnecessary delays are 
occurring; impacting upon the efficiency of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
(DIAC) and the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) and thus wasting resources which are 
already under great strain. This system also gives fuel to the arguments that “false-refugees” 
are clogging up the system, when in fact they have no other way to seek protection.  
 
This Ministerial discretion has been described as “unpredictable and opaque”54, even an 
“expensive dinosaur”55. In addition to imposing such a major and inappropriate burden on the 
Minister, it is also a most expensive measure. It is costing the Australian government a great 
deal of money every day to keep these applicants in detention while they wait for the Minister 
to get around to their case. In a case study examined by the National Council of Churches56, 
an estimate was drawn up of the cost of keeping a family kept in detention for four years who 
were eventually granted visas from a Ministerial discretion. It was outlined that it would have 
cost the state between $1.8 and $15.8 million to keep this family in detention, depending on 
where they were detained. If a system of complementary protection was in place, therefore 
allowing them to get to the relevant assessment far quicker, the costs would have been 
                                                
51 Senator Evans announced to a Senate estimates committee on February 19th 2008, reported in “I 
should not play God: Evans”, the Sydney Morning Herald, 20 February, 2008 
52 Proust, Elizabeth, “Report to the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship on the Appropriate Use of 
Ministerial Powers under the Migration and Citizenship Acts and Migration Regulations”, January 
2008, available at http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/media-releases/2008/proust-report.pdf 
(accessed 10 February, 2009) 
53 The Age, 9 January, 2009 
54 Ibid. p. 132 
55 Thomson, James, “Why Australia needs a Complementary Protection Visa”, National Council of 
Churches in Australia, transcript of radio programme on Complementary Protection, available at 
www.ncca.org.au/cws/rdp/issues/complementary_protection (accessed 15 February, 2009) 
56 “Complementary Protection - The Way Ahead”, a January 2004 Report developed by the Refugee 
Council of Australia, Amnesty International and the National Council of Churches of Australia , 
available at www.ncca.org.au/cws/rdp/issues/complementary_protection (accessed 15 February, 2009) 
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reduced to between $220,000 and $2 million. This example vividly indicates the money 
which is being wasted with the current system. 
 
Under the various human rights instruments which Australia is a party to as discussed above, 
it is a requirement that if someone falls within one of the specific treaty grounds, they must 
not be sent back to their home country. Yet within the Australian system, this Ministerial 
discretion is non-compellable. As outlined, in some cases the Minister might not even look at 
the case. These obligations are not something which Australia can afford to treat lightly as 
they stem from Australia’s ratification of the various treaties. Dealing with such international 
obligations by means of this informal discretionary mechanism is not acceptable, and reform 
must be introduced. I will now look to the case study of Elmi v. Australia, a case which sadly 
illustrates the irrationality of Australia’s current system.  
 
3.3 Case Study: Elmi v. Australia57 
 
In this case, a Somalian asylum seeker from a persecuted minority clan claimed refugee status 
in Australia. While in detention, his claim was rejected by both DIAC and the RRT on the 
grounds that any harm he would face upon return to Somalia would be because of a situation 
of generalized violence from civil war, rather than a specific Refugee Convention reason. 
Thus, even though there was a clear case that Mr. Elmi would be subjected to torture upon 
return, his claim failed as it did not fall within the strict legal definition. While Mr. Elmi was 
still in detention, the appeal finally reached the stage of Ministerial Discretion where the 
Minister refused to exercise his discretion. Due to the non-reviewable nature of the system, 
Mr. Elmi could not know if his particular protection needs under CAT had even been 
assessed.  
A complaint was subsequently made to UNCAT arguing that Mr. Elmi’s deportation would 
be in breach of the non-refoulement provision under Article 3 of CAT58. UNCAT outlined 
that these non-refoulement obligations did in fact come into play, and declared Australia thus 
had an obligation to refrain from returning the applicant home. As outlined above, the 
committee’s decision does not bind governments, and thus Australia was legally free to 
ignore its ruling. Instead of granting a protection visa in response to the UNCAT ruling, the 
Minister outlined that he would have to apply through the whole system again. Thus, after a 
                                                
57 Sadiq Shek Elmi V Australia, Communication No. 120/1998: Australia. 25/05/99. 
CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 
58 Article 3 of CAT outlines that “No state party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture” 
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ruling by an international committee that this person is in need of protection under obligations 
which Australia is “duty-bound to respect under international law”59, the Australian 
government’s response was to put that person through the whole drawn-out procedure again. 
Clearly if a proper legislated mechanism was in place for assessing complementary protection 
grounds, Mr. Elmi could have had his claim assessed on the ground of torture from the start, 
and would not have to have spent such a long and ultimately pointless length of time in 
detention. In this case, Mr. Elmi in fact left Australia “voluntarily” rather than face more 
prolonged detention.  
It is clear that under the current system, the failure to implement effective domestic measures 
results in a lack of accommodation for those in need of international protection. While the 
Minister may give consideration to the obligations in his discretionary assessment, his 
decision in the end is not reviewable, and thus without accountability or transparency, there is 
no guarantee that Australia is in fact meeting its obligations. Australia has ratified these 
commitments to international protection, and it is time a system is put in place to prevent 
cases like this one from occurring again. I will now look to the proposed Draft Model for 
Complementary Protection in Australia, which will, it is hoped, be part of the new era in the 
Australian immigration system. If this Draft Model system was in place for Mr. Elmi, perhaps 
there may have been a different outcome. Assessing his claim under the Complementary 
Protection system could have saved a prolonged period of detention, and could have resulted 
in a protection visa being granted to someone who was deserving of international protection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
59 McAdam, Jane, “Complementary protection: Labour’s point of departure”, Inside Story article, 3 
December, 2008, available at www.inside.org.au/complementary-protection (accessed 15 February, 
2009) 
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3.4 Proposal for reform: the Draft Complementary Protection Visa Model  
 
 
Box 2. The Draft Model for the Complementary Protection of Asylum Seekers 
Protection visa 
application is lodged 
Claims are 
assessed against 
the refugee criteria 
Refugee criteria are 
met 
 
Applicant assessed 
against section 501 
character test 
 
Refugee criteria 
not met. 
Complementary 
protection criteria 
are assessed 
 
Applicant 
excluded under 
1F of the Refugee 
Convention. 
Application 
refused 
Applicant satisfies 
section 501 character 
test. 
Protection visa is 
granted 
 
Complementary 
protection 
criteria are met 
 
Applicant may seek merits review 
by AAT. Applicant’s status would 
be resolved consistent with 
Australia’s international obligations 
i.e. grant of Removal Pending 
Bridging visa 
 
 
Applicant does not satisfy 
section 501 character test. 
Application may be refused 
 
Complementary 
protection criteria not 
met. Application 
refused.  Applicant 
may seek merits review 
by RRT 
 
RRT assesses applicant’s 
claims firstly against refugee 
criteria and then against 
complementary protection 
criteria 
 
RRT 
affirms 
decision 
RRT 
remits 
decision 
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The Draft Model was drawn up by DIAC in November 2008 as a proposal for a system of 
Complementary Protection. The system is intended to be based solely on the international 
obligations which Australia has committed to under CAT and the ICCPR, and would provide 
the recipients with equal status and rights as refugees in Australia, save one difference of the 
Travel document60.  The Draft Model proposes that a single assessment procedure will be 
developed, with access to merits and judicial review. In order to maintain the primacy of the 
Refugee Convention, a two step system is proposed. The applicants’ protection needs would 
be first assessed against the Refugee Convention, and only if the strict criteria of the 
“refugee” definition were not met would the grounds of complementary protection then be 
examined. McAdam outlines that this proposed system would therefore allow decisions 
makers to continue to “rigorously test and develop the bounds of the refugee definition” while 
at the same time also have “additional grounds on which they could grant protection in 
accordance with Australia’s international obligations”61. As outlined in the 2005 ExCom 
Conclusion on International Protection62, it is vital that an international protection system is 
developed in a way which avoids protections gaps and allows those persons in need of 
international protection to get it. In order to assess whether the Draft Model will adequately 
fill the gap in protection of asylum seekers in Australia, it is necessary to look at the details of 
the proposed system. 
 
3.4 (a) Who will be protected by the Draft Model? 
 
In the Draft Model, DIAC recognises a broad range of people who can be generally included 
within complementary protection; including persons to whom Australia has an actual non-
refoulement obligation under an international treaty, stateless persons, persons fleeing armed 
conflict or serious public disorder, persons fleeing indiscriminate effects of violence and 
serious threats to life, liberty and security, and victims of natural or ecological disasters63.  
However, the proposed complementary protection system in Australia will be limited to the 
first category i.e. persons who fall under specific non-refoulement obligations contained in 
                                                
60 The travel document outlines the terms under which a refugee can travel. This equal status for those 
granted Complementary Protection status is a step up from the E.U. system, which I will look at below. 
61 McAdam, Jane, “Complementary protection: Labour’s point of departure”, Inside Story article, 3 
December, 2008, available at www.inside.org.au/complementary-protection (accessed 15 February, 
2009) 
62 ExCom Conclusion No. 103 on the Provision of International Protection Including Through 
Complementary Forms of Protection (2005) available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,EXCONC,,,43576e292,0.html (accessed 22 April, 2009) 
63 “Draft Complementary Protection Visa Model: Australia”, circulated prior to the 13 November, 2008 
consultation on complementary protection and work rights, Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship, www.immi.gov.au (accessed June, 2009) 
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human rights instruments which Australia has committed to. It is thus proposed by DIAC that 
the existing subclass 866 (Permanent) Protection visa will be extended to include those who 
fall under Australia’s non-refoulement obligations in Article 3 of CAT, Art 6 and 7 of the 
ICCPR, and Article 1 of the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. These articles, in 
summary, involve the inherent right to life, and the absolute prohibition on torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.  
 
The Draft Model therefore does not cover other persons in need of international protection, 
and thus potentially fails to wholly fill the gap in protection of asylum seekers. The most 
contentious category of people omitted from the Draft Model is those fleeing “indiscriminate 
effects of violence”. DIAC has indicated that this category of persons is unnecessary as a 
separate category as most people will fall under the ambit of the Refugee Convention, or 
under the new provision covering the non-refoulement obligation on inhuman/degrading 
treatment grounds. UNHCR argue however, that although this category may fall under the 
Refugee Convention, “explicit inclusion”64 in the Draft Model would be necessary so as to 
ensure there are no gaps in protection. This category is covered by the E.U. Qualification 
Directive and its interpretation has proved a challenging issue among the Member States 
which I will discuss below. This wider scope of protection would of course be welcomed in 
the Australian proposed system, but from the European experience it is clear that the 
terminology used is vital to ensure protection is expanded and not narrowed, which is 
occurring in some Member States. Thus, if the category of “indiscriminate violence” is 
introduced into the Draft Model, albeit with slightly different wording to the troublesome 
E.U. section, all people that fall within this category would be ensured protection. 
 
3.4 (b) Who will be excluded from the Draft Model?  
 
Under the Refugee Convention, it is recognised that certain categories of persons can be 
excluded from the Convention, and thus can be returned to their home country 
notwithstanding that they may have a well-founded fear of persecution65. Under the Draft 
Model, these exclusions clauses under 1(f) are adopted66. However, the Draft Model contains 
                                                
64 “Draft Complementary Protection Visa Model: Australia, UNHCR Comments”, 6 January, 2009, 
available at www.unhcr.org.au (accessed June, 2009) 
65 Article 1(f) specifies that the Convention will not apply to persons whom there are “serious 
reasons” for considering that they have committed a “crime against peace, a war crime, a 
crime against humanity,… a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge,… or 
has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”, the 
Refugee Convention, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_c_ref.htm (accessed 12 February, 2009)  
66 In comparison, the E.U. exclusion clauses, which I will shortly discuss, are far wider than 
article 1(f) and vary according to what status the applicant is granted. 
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a further hurdle which the applicant must pass. Once a person has been deemed entitled to 
complementary protection, or indeed has been deemed a “refugee” under the Convention, 
they still must face the section 501 Character Assessment Test in the Migration Act67.  
 
Within the character test, a person will be deemed to have failed the test if they have a 
“substantial criminal record”68. However, within “substantial criminal record” someone who 
has been sentenced to life imprisonment and someone who has been in prison for one year are 
contained in the same category. Furthermore, a person can fail if the Minister decides because 
of the applicant’s “general conduct”69 in the past; they are not of good character. Some of 
these provisions within the character test seem absurd, and the fact that a person can lose their 
right to international protection, even after fitting within the status of “refugee” or someone in 
need of complementary protection, is highly unfair. The Department outlined that this 
character assessment is “in line with international practise”70, where many states have adopted 
systems for excluding people with serious character concerns. If people have committed a 
crime, but have atoned for it, there is no reason they should be re-punished when they are 
fleeing from persecution and in search of asylum. Of course this area is a highly politically 
sensitive one, but in order to provide comprehensive and fair protection for those in need, it is 
essential to have further clarification and differentiation within the character test. It is vital 
that these character assessments are monitored by judicial review and reformed where 
necessary as they are essentially diluting the human right to seek asylum. 
 
Where an applicant has been recognised as being in need of international protection, whether 
through refugee status or complementary protection, the denial of such protection on 
character grounds must be done through a transparent and fair approach with consistent 
assessment and clear criteria.  However, within the section 501 procedure, the Minister 
decides whether the applicant passes the “character test”71, and if the test is failed, the Draft 
Model indicates that the Minister retains a discretion in deciding the final outcome. The 
problem of Ministerial discretion thus remains in the new proposed system. The Minister is 
still left with the ever-criticised position of “playing God” in certain circumstances, and so 
this remaining ministerial discretion is in need of legislating. UNHCR has indicated that 
                                                
67 Migration Act 1958, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ma1958118/ 
(accessed 5 February, 2009) 
68 Ibid. s 501 ss 7 
69 Ibid. s 501 ss 6 
70 “Draft Complementary Protection Visa Model: Australia”, circulated prior to the 13 November, 2008 
consultation on complementary protection and work rights, Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship, www.immi.gov.au (accessed June, 2009) 
71 Migration Act 1958, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ma1958118/ 
(accessed 5 February, 2009), s 501 ss 6 
Sarah Farrelly  308263642 
 
 23 
where there is a decision regarding a “substantive legal obligation not to refoule pursuant to 
an international obligation”, that decision should not be left up to Ministerial discretion. Even 
though it may only arise in exceptional cases, it should still be defined in legislation. The 
character assessment thus contained in the current Australian immigration system, and 
maintained in the proposed Draft Model could potentially pose a barrier to the effective 
implementation of its international obligations of protection. 
 
3.4 (c) Will the Draft Model succeed in filling the gaps of protection? 
 
After having analysed both the current and proposed system in Australia, it is now necessary 
to reflect on my original aim of examining whether the Draft Model for Complementary 
Protection will indeed fill the gap in the protection of asylum seekers. The Draft Model will 
clearly be a major step forward in affording international protection, by now assessing asylum 
seekers against the non-refoulement obligations as well as the original Refugee Convention 
criteria. With a proper codified system of Complementary Protection, Australia will no longer 
be meeting its international obligations with a discretionary mechanism. The downside, 
however, is that the new categories of protection do not go far enough, excluding many 
persons in need of protection. As will be analysed shortly, the E.U. system has expanded 
further, to include the category of “indiscriminate violence”. The fact that Australia is now 
introducing legislation to cover the gaps in protection, it is desirable that this legislation goes 
as far as possible to prevent certain holes remaining.  
 
A major upside of the new system is that it will remove the irrational aspect of the current 
procedures, in that it will now result in a definite assessment against the complementary 
protection criteria rather than simply a minister’s discretional assessment. It remains that 
asylum seekers must still go through the Refugee Convention status determination process 
first, but this will ensure that the primacy of this document is maintained.  This aspect has 
proven to be as issue with the E.U. system, where there is a possibility that Complementary 
Protection is being afforded when in fact the asylum seekers should have been granted 
refugee status. This is of course not a desirable outcome, and so it seems positive that the two-
step process is maintained. 
 
The Draft Model is also succeeding (for the most part) in removing the controversial 
Ministerial Discretion. With a review system now in place, the “non-compellable, non-
reviewable, non-delegable” power will be thankfully put to rest. However, as outlined above, 
a Ministerial Discretion will be maintained for applicants who do not pass the “character 
test”. This character test poses a threat to the full implementation of Australia’s international 
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obligations. It evidences an area where the sovereignty of the state is trumping the meeting of 
international obligations, by the state choosing to refuse those of undesirable character. The 
Draft Model should ensure that a proper review process is available, where the dubious 
“character test” is not passed, and that it is not just left up to the Minister’s discretion. I will 
now turn to a comparative analysis with the E.U. system of Complementary Protection. It 
illustrates both successes and problems which can occur within such a protection system. 
 
3.5 A comparative analysis: “Subsidiary Protection” in the European Union 
  
“Subsidiary Protection” was introduced in the E.U. as part of the Qualification Directive72 in 
April 2004, with the aim of ensuring Member States “apply common criteria for the 
identification of persons genuinely in need of international protection”73. It was intended to 
remove the “asylum lottery”74 which had formed due to the striking disparities in laws across 
the Member States. In law, the Directive expanded the scope of international protection. 
However, in practice research has found that subsidiary protection is in fact not granted to 
significant numbers of persons who are in need of international protection75. This gap in 
protection is due to two central factors; procedural flaws among the Member States and a 
narrow interpretation of the provisions of the Directive76. The Qualification Directive thus 
provides an insightful precedent for a system of Complementary Protection, illustrating many 
of the problems which this form of protection can face.  
 
The Directive itself takes a holistic approach to international protection needs, containing 
minimum standards for both the recognition of refuges status and subsidiary protection.  
Subsidiary protection is thus complementary to refugee protection, and a person entitled to it 
is defined as  
“a third country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a 
refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of 
origin… would face a real risk of suffering serious harm (see Box 
                                                
72 The “Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection and the content of the protection granted”, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0083:EN:HTML (accessed 15 February, 
2009), hereinafter, the “Directive” 
73 Ibid. at Recital 6 
74 The European Council on Refugees and Exiles Press Release, “Europe must end Asylum Lottery”, 4 
November, 2004 available at www.ecre.org/files/asylumlot.pdf (accessed 10 February, 2009) 
75 “Asylum in the European Union- a Study of the implementation of the Qualification Directive”, 
UNHCR Report, November 2007, available at www.unhcr.org (accessed 20 February, 2009), at para. 
1.2.5 
76 Ibid. 
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 3 below)”77 
Persons seeking asylum in the E.U. are thus assessed against criteria which is far broader than 
the legal definition under the Refugee Convention, and, if it is found they are in need of 
protection, they are granted a formal legal status. This has resulted in a potential undermining 
of the primacy of the Refugee Convention, with some asylum seekers being granted 
“complementary protection” status, when they should in fact have been granted the status of a 
“refugee”. This is particularly worrying seeing that under the Directive, those granted 
complementary protection status are afforded lesser rights and entitlements to legal 
“refugees”78.  McAdam outlines that States are perhaps even favouring subsidiary protection, 
so as to avoid “the more stringent obligations”79 required for Refugee Convention refugees.  
 
As can be seen from Box 4 in Annex I, there are numerous areas in which the Directive and 
the Australian Draft Model contrast. I will now focus on one of those areas, indiscriminate 
violence, as it is a contentious matter for Australia. Article 15 of the Directive covers the non-
refoulement obligations of the ICCPR and CAT, as well as this additional category of 
“indiscriminate violence”. As outlined above, UNHCR have argued for the inclusion of this 
category in the Draft Model to ensure persons in need of international protection do not fall 
through the gaps. Even if “indiscriminate violence” is not included in the final Australian 
legislation, this examination is still vital as European case law in this area can provide 
guidance as to how complementary protection has, and is still being developed. 
 
3.5 (a) “Indiscriminate violence” – Has its inclusion succeeded in increasing protection? 
 
The Qualification Directive has extended to include the category of persons at risk of “serious 
harm” due to “indiscriminate violence” within Article 15(c), and has ever since experienced 
many problems with its interpretation. It has generated a wide range of diverse approaches to 
interpretation of the Directive, and hence to the grant of protection. Thus, it can be argued that 
instead of harmonising approaches among Member States, the article’s contentious wording 
has resulted in strikingly diverse interpretations of the provision and therefore rendering the 
protection offered “illusory”80. A highly restrictive approach has been taken to the term  
 
 
                                                
77 The Directive, Article 2(e) 
78 See Annex I Box 4 for details on rights and entitlements 
79 McAdam, Jane, “The Refugee Convention as a rights blueprint for persons in need of international 
protection”, UNHCR Research paper No. 125, July 2006 
80 “Asylum in the European Union- a Study of the implementation of the Qualification Directive”, 
UNHCR Report, November 2007, available at www.unhcr.org (accessed 20 February, 2009), at para 
1.2.5 
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QUALIFICATION FOR SUBSIDIARY PROTECTION 
Article 15 
Serious harm 
Serious harm consists of 
(a) death penalty or execution; or 
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or 
(c) serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in 
situations of international or internal armed conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3. Article 15 of the Qualification Directive 
  
“individual threat”, with a requirement for the applicant to show they are greater risk of harm 
than the rest of the population. This is therefore denying subsidiary protection to those who 
face the same risk as the rest of their population81. Further, a restrictive approach has been 
adopted in Germany as to the assessment of “risk”. There the implementing domestic 
legislation requires that the risk be “inevitable” with a “near certainty” of death, rather than 
the Qualification Directive requirement of simply a “real risk”. Similarly, regarding the term 
“internal armed conflict”, there are large discrepancies over what this should be defined as. 
This is resulting massively divergent opinions across Member States. For example, the 
situation in Iraq was accepted in France as falling within “internal armed conflict”, yet in 
Sweden it was not82. It is thus clear that without specific terminology and guidance on how to 
interpret the Directive’s provisions, Member States may narrow the definitions in this way, 
therefore denying protection to those deserving of it.  
 
3.5 (b) Has the Qualification Directive succeeded in filling the gaps in protection? 
 
The E.U. system aimed at harmonising the asylum seekers processes across Europe. It is 
debatable whether it has in fact succeeded in this aim, with the divergent interpretations 
outlined above. Whether or not the Qualification Directive will fill the gaps in protection for 
asylum seekers remains to be seen. This system does amply illustrate the dangers of codifying 
                                                
81 Ibid. Chapter IV 
82 Ibid. Chapter IV p. 76 
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complementary protection, seeking to “dilute their obligations to a minimum level”83. While it 
does give enforcement to certain non-refoulement obligations, the system that is in place is 
potentially undermining the Refugee Convention. While the Directive includes a wide range 
of categories of persons in need of protection, the discrepancies in interpretation, particularly 
with respect to Article 15(c), is proving a challenge to protection. It is without a doubt an 
improvement on Australia’s current system, but whether the Draft Model will learn from the 
E.U.’s problems is yet to be seen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
83 McAdam, Jane, “The Refugee Convention as a rights blueprint for persons in need of international 
protection”, UNHCR Research paper No. 125, July 2006 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
The essential idea of a complementary protection system is to adopt minimum standards for 
persons who are in need of an alternative form of international protection. To ensure there are 
no remaining gaps in the protection of asylum seekers, it is essential that the international 
human rights instruments are regarded as interconnected mechanisms which together 
constitute the international obligations to which States are committed84. The Draft Model in 
Australia is a step in the right direction to filling the gaps in protection, connecting the 
Refugee Convention with other human rights instruments. While it may not go as far as is 
needed to ensure protection for all those falling outside the Refugee Convention, it can 
provide a starting block upon which further protection provisions can be built. The pitfalls 
caused by having elusive definitions are clear from the E.U. experience. Should the Draft 
Model be expanded to cover further categories of persons, it is essential that the terminology 
used avoids the possibility of narrowing, rather than expanding protection.  
 
Refugees are a global legal responsibility and it is essential that Australia steps up to its 
international obligations. Australia’s avoidance of obligations of non-refoulement has resulted 
in many persons in need of protection suffering as a result. As a sovereign State, Australia has 
the right to protect its borders, but it also has a responsibility to do this in a manner which is 
in accordance with human rights treaties. With the era of change promised in the current 
Labour government’s immigration policies, it would be a great shame for this area of asylum 
law to go unreformed. Many immigration policies adopted by previous governments have 
been reviewed in light of Australia’s “new values”. Changes have come, and the motions are 
now in place for a reform in the gap of protection. If new legislation in introduced, it is hoped 
that Australia will offer protection to a wider category of those in need in a transparent and 
efficient manner. The Draft Model, if slightly faulty, is in place85. What is needed now is the 
political will to support it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
84 Discussed in McAdam, Jane, “The Refugee Convention as a rights blueprint for persons in need of 
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85 As of 12 June, 2009, the Draft Model is still in parliamentary processes 
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ANNEX I 
 
AUSTRALIA E.U. 
 
Indiscriminate violence 
 
 
- Indiscriminate violence not included in draft. If 
recommend widening scope to include indiscriminate 
violence- should use more careful wording – see 
experience of E.U. 
 
- DIAC not in favour of adopting this category as feel 
most people will be caught under refugee or inhuman 
treatment grounds. 
 
 
- Qualification Directive has extended to include 
indiscriminate violence-  Art 15(c) has led to problems 
– generated a wide range of differing approaches by 
Member States to its interpretation and hence the grant 
of protection  
- 15(c) has been limited by restrictive definition of 
“individual threat”.  
- Benefits and problems with this inclusion.  
 
Exclusion Clauses 
 
 
- Broader exclusions clauses than the Refugee 
Convention in the form of s501 character test.  
 
- Problem of remaining ministerial discretion. 
 
 
- Broader exclusion clauses than Refugee Convention 
 
Entitlements and Rights 
 
 
- Equal entitlements, only exception is the Refugee 
Travel document. But those granted Complementary 
Protection status also get a travel document therefore 
complying with freedom of movement. 
 
 
Allows Member States to grant lesser legal status and 
fewer rights than Refugee Convention – shorter 
residency permits, more limited family unity social 
welfare and health care inter alia. 
  
Member States only prepared to pay for a lower set of 
rights for all those recognised, because of state budgets, 
and increasing number of people entitled to entitlements 
=> Differential treatment between “refugees” and 
Complementary Protection. No justification in 
international law for differential treatment.  
 
Has led for some dilution of Refugee Convention-
Member States granting Complementary Protection 
when should be Refugee Status because they want to 
grant the more stringent rights and entitlements.  
 
Procedure 
 
Australia- clear two-step process for Complementary 
Protection. Will fully examine case under Refugee 
Convention first, and only when that fails, then consider 
under Complementary Protection. Clearly does not 
undermine Refugee Convention. 
 
Subsidiary Protection system– seems to be a possibility 
of undermining Refugee Convention 
Box  4. Comparative analysis between the Draft Model and the Qualification Directive 
Sarah Farrelly  308263642 
 
 30 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
  
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on 28 July, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_c_ref.htm (accessed 12 
February, 2009) 
 
1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa, 
http://www.africaunion.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Proto
cols/Refugee_Convention.pdf (accessed 16 March, 2009) 
 
1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, 
http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/international/CentralAmerica.PDF (accessed 16 
March, 2009) 
  
“Asylum in the European Union- a Study of the implementation of the Qualification 
Directive”, UNHCR Report, November 2007, available at www.unhcr.org (accessed 
20 February, 2009)  
 
“Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialised Countries, 2008 - Statistical Overview 
of Asylum Applications Lodged in Europe and selected Non-European Countries”, 
UNHCR Report 24th March, 2009, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/49c796572.pdf (accessed 10 May, 
2009) 
 
Cali, Basak, and Meckled-Garcia, Saladin (2006), “Lost in translation – the human 
rights ideal and international human rights law”, The Legalization of Human Rights, 
Routledge 
  
The Charter of the United Nations came into force 24th October (1945), available at 
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/ch-cont.htm (accessed 4 February, 2009) 
  
Sarah Farrelly  308263642 
 
 31 
“Complementary Protection - The Way Ahead”, January 2004 Report developed by 
the Refugee Council of Australia, Amnesty International and the National Council of 
Churches of Australia, available at 
www.ncca.org.au/cws/rdp/issues/complementary_protection (accessed 15 February, 
2009) 
 
“Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status 
of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise 
need international protection and the content of the protection granted”, 29 April, 
2004, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0083:EN:HTML 
(accessed 15 February, 2009) 
 
Crock, Mary, “The Refugees Convention at 50: Mid-life Crisis of Terminal 
Inadequacy? An Australian perspective” in Kneebone, Susan (ed), The Refugees 
Convention 50 Years On: Globalisation and International Law, Ashgate: Aldershot, 
UK (2003), p. 47-91 
  
“Draft Complementary Protection Visa Model: Australia, UNHCR Comments”, 6 
January, 2009, available at www.unhcr.org.au (accessed June, 2009) 
 
“Draft Complementary Protection Visa Model: Australia”, circulated prior to the 13 
November, 2008 consultation on complementary protection and work rights, 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship, www.immi.gov.au (accessed June, 2009) 
 
The European Council on Refugees and Exiles Press Release, “Europe must end 
Asylum Lottery”, 4 November, 2004 available at www.ecre.org/files/asylumlot.pdf 
(accessed 10 February, 2009) 
 
ExCom Conclusion No. 103 on the Provision of International Protection Including 
Through Complementary Forms of Protection (2005) available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,EXCONC,,,43576e292,0.html (accessed 22 
April, 2009) 
 
Sarah Farrelly  308263642 
 
 32 
Field, Nina, “Playing God with sanctuary – A study of Australia’s approach to 
complementary protection obligations beyond the Refugee Convention” (quoting 
Thomson, James, from the National Council of Churches), Oxfam Australia Report, 
June 2008, available at http://www.oxfam.org.au/campaigns/refugees/docs/CP-
PlayingGod-080604.pdf (accessed 16 February, 2009)  
 
Goodwin-Gill, Guy s., “Editorial: Asylum 2001 – A Convention and a Purpose” 
(2001) 13 International Journal of Refugee Law 1 
 
Grant, Ruth (1987), John Locke’s Liberalism, University of Chicago Press 
 
“Informal EC Discussion Paper on the legislative work by the European Commission 
regarding the definition of the concept of ‘refugee’ and the subsidiary protection”, 14 
May, 2001 
 
Lillich, Richard B. (1984), The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary 
International Law, Manchester University Press 
 
Mandal, R, “Protection Mechanisms outside of the 1951 Convention 
(‘Complementary Protection’) UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series 
PPLA/2005/02 (June 2005) 
 
McAdam, Jane (2007), Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law, 
Oxford University Press  
 
McAdam, Jane, “Complementary protection: Labour’s point of departure”, Inside 
Story article, 3 December, 2008, available at www.inside.org.au/complementary-
protection (accessed 15 February, 2009) 
 
McAdam, Jane, “The Refugee Convention as a rights blueprint for persons in need of 
international protection”, UNHCR Research paper No. 125, July 2006 
 
Morgenthau, Hans (1993), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace, edited by Kenneth W. Thompson, Boston: McGraw Hill 
Sarah Farrelly  308263642 
 
 33 
 
Morgenthau, Hans (1946), Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, University of 
Chicago Press 
  
“New Directions in Detention- Restoring integrity to Australia’s Immigration 
System”, speech by Minister for Immigration Chris Evans, at Australian National 
University, Canberra, 29th July 2008, text available at 
http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/speeches/2008/ce080729.htm (accessed 3 
February, 2009) 
 
Proust, Elizabeth, “Report to the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship on the 
Appropriate Use of Ministerial Powers under the Migration and Citizenship Acts and 
Migration Regulations”, January 2008, available at 
http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/media-releases/2008/proust-report.pdf 
(accessed 10 February, 2009) 
  
“Providing International Protection including through complementary forms of 
protection”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2006, Vol. 25, p. 143-152 
 
Sadiq Shek Elmi V Australia, Communication No. 120/1998: Australia. 25/05/99. 
CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 
 
Schwarz, Rolf, “The paradox of sovereignty, regime type and human rights 
compliance”, The International Journal of Human Rights, (2004) Vol. 8 (2), p. 199-
215 
 
Sydney Morning Herald (2008) “I should not play God: Evans”, 20 February 
 
Thomson, James, “Why Australia needs a Complementary Protection Visa”, National 
Council of Churches in Australia, transcript of radio programme on Complementary 
Protection, available at www.ncca.org.au/cws/rdp/issues/complementary_protection 
(accessed 15 February, 2009) 
 
Sarah Farrelly  308263642 
 
 34 
UNHCR’s Agenda for Protection, 3rd Edition, October 2003, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3e637b194 (accessed 12 
February, 2009) 
 
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, adopted on 10 December, 1984, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm (accessed 12 February, 2009) 
 
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted on 16 
December, 1966, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (accessed 12 
February, 2009) 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly on 
10 December, 1948, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (accessed 5 
February, 2009) 
 
Van Selm-Thorburn, Joanna (1998), Refugee Protection in Europe – Lessons of the 
Yugoslav Crisis, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
 
Vedsted-Hansen, Jens, “Complementary or subsidiary protection? Offering an 
appropriate status without undermining refugee protection”, UNHCR Working Paper 
No. 52, available at www.unhcr.org (accessed 15 February, 2009) 
 
 
 
